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Spinoza's unrelenting emphasis on determinism and 
necessity seems, at first glance, incompatible with his 
espousal of human freedom. In what follows, I expli-
cate Spinoza's meaning of the term "freedom" and argue 
that hi8 use of the term is compatible with his theses 
of determinism and necessity. I conclude by noting 
some problems that Spinoza's determinism poses for his 
moral theory. 
Spinoza's "Denial" of Freedom 
Spinoza does reject some meanings of the term 
freedom. He repudiates the idea of "free choice." (By 
"free choice" I mean the possibility that a man could 
have chosen to act other than he actually did.) He 
further dismisses any account of "will" or "desire" 
that would support a credible account of free choice. 
For Spinoza, nature admits of no contingency, ca-
price, or indeterminateness. In fact, man's very idea 
of free choice is the illusory result of inadequate 
knowledge. "(M]en believe themselves to be free," he 
writes, "simply because they are conscious of their ac-
tions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those ac-
tions are determined. 1 1 1 Man is limited by the confused 
perception that characterizes inadequate knowledge and, 
hence, delusively ascribes the adjective "free" .to an 
alleged phenomenon of "choice." According to Spinoza, 
humans fail to recognize that acts of choice are caused 
and subsequently imagine "themselves free inasmuch as 
they are conscious of [their] volitions and desires," 
but they "never even dream, in their ignorance, of the 
causes which have disposed them to wish and desire." 2 
Spinoza disagrees with those who assert that "human 
actions depend on the will," since "this is a mere 
phrase without any idea to correspond thereto." 1 Much 
like the intellect, the will is merely "a particular 
mode of thinking." Whether the will is conceived as 
finite or infinite, it too "requires a cause by which 
it should be conditioned to exist and act."* Moreover, 
the will is related to God because "it must be condi-
tioned by God I Prop, xxix] to exist and act in a par-
ticular manner."* Explaining human action in terms of 
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the will illustrates our ignorance; sufficient accounts 
of human action derive only from our having clear and 
adequate ideas of what causes behavior. 
Analogously, Spinoza rejectes the notion of "deci-
sion" as representing an adequate explanation of "free 
choice." Clearly, "a mental decision and a bodily ap-
petite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or 
rather, are one and the same thing . . . . " ' A deci-
sion is not free (i.e., a decision cannot be the cause 
of itself). External causes, then, constrain decisions 
as well. 
Spinoza flatly affirms that "everything proceeds 
from a sort of necessity, and with the utmost perfec-
tion": 7 
Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all 
things are conditioned to exist and operate in a 
particular manner by the necessity of divine 
nature.• 
Men are not free in the fictitious sense that they 
imagine; ignorance—inadequate knowledge—is the source 
of this false meaning of freedom that Spinoza rejects. 
Nothing in nature is indeterminate or uncaused, as 
Spinoza remarked in a letter to Boxel: "the world (is) 
a necessary effect of divine nature," thus he "utterly 
(denies that) the world has been made by chance."• 
With respect to necessity and human choice, Stuart 
Hampshire aptly concludes that 
Any statement of the kind "an alternative action 
was possible" or "he could have done otherwise," 
is necessarily the sign of the incompleteness of 
our scientific knowledge or an expression of our 
present state of ignorance . . . .*' 
In conclusion, then, human choices are neither uncaused 
nor arbitrary; that choices are capricious is, for 
Spinoza, chimerical—an idea born out of ignorance. 
Necessity applies to "will" and "decision." Will 
is not a free cause, "only a necessary or constrained 
cause." 1 1 Will is externally caused and in no way can 
it adequately support the idea of "free choice"; the 
will is determined to exist and act only by God. Thus, 
Spinoza clearly opposes any conception of "freedom" as 
tantamount to being uncaused or indeterminate. Rather, 
causes determine the will and, hence, human behavior 
can be considered neither capricious nor accidental. 
Correspondingly, since "decision" is simultaneous with 
a determined state, it is not a free cause. So deci-
sion also fails to sufficiently account for the idea of 
"free choice." 
In conclusion, then, Spinoza allows for no "free 
choice"; the scope of necessity is universal. Necessi-
ty precludes the possibility of "free choice," whether 
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conceived under the rubric of "will" or "decision." 
"Things could not have been brought into being by God 
in any manner or in an order different from that which 
in fact has obtained." 1 1 Hence, man could not have 
acted other than he did; no alternative choice and ac-
tion were even possible: 
Each so called "act of choice" in the matter is 
in reality a necessarily determined assertion or 
denial . . . . The "volitio," or "mentis decre-
tum,11 is thus—like any ideal or extended event-¬ 
absolutely determined and necessary. 1 1 
God, Spinoza's all-inclusive substance (Deus save Natu-
ra), comprises the universe, and each "mental" or "phy-
sical" event of experience follows necessarily from 
this one substance. 
Spinoza and Cause 
Spinoza rejects the notion of final causes in 
nature; "everything in nature precedes from a sort of 
necessity and with the utmost perfection." 1* The 
notion of final cause "does away with the perfection of 
God: for if God acts for an object, he necessarily 
desires something which he lacks." 1* But this idea is 
absurd, for it contradicts the very nature of God. 
Accordingly, Spinoza states "that nature has no goal in 
view, and that final causes are mere human figments."" 
When men strive to illustrate "that nature does nothing 
in vain . . .," they "seem to have demonstrated that 
nature, the gods, and men are all mad together." 1 7 But 
what does Spinoza affirm about types of causes? 
Spinoza accepts the idea of efficient causality, 
and he attributes it to the deity. God is "the sole 
free cause."" God, "absolutely the first cause,"" 
encompasses all that is. Everything that is, "is in 
God, and without God nothing can be, or be 
conceived." 1 0 "From the necessity of divine nature 
must follow an infinite number of things in infinite 
ways . . . . M 1 1 He "is the efficient cause of all that 
can follow within the sphere of infinite intellect." 1 1 
This efficient causality applies "not only to the ex-
istence of things, but also of their essence." 1 1 
Things depend on God for their "coming into existence" 
and their "continuing in existence" or being. 1* 
Does Spinoza regard the notions of formal and 
material causality as equally crucial to the descrip-
tion of God? His answer to this question is negative. 
Efficient causality best characterizes God's activity. 
Spinoza rejected Aristotle's distinction of matter and 
form, modifying them with the substantival attributes 
of thought and extension. Accordingly, as Wolfson 
notes, the Aristotelean "designation of causes as 
material and formal likewise disappears"; Spinoza sub-
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sumes formal causality under efficient causality, hence 
the efficient cause most aptly describes God's 
nature. 2 8 
Efficient causality applies to both the physical 
and mental modes of experience. God, the efficient 
cause of that which occurs within the sphere of infi-
nite intellect, can surely be regarded as a thinking 
thing. Thus it is apparent that "the actual being of 
ideas owns God as its cause," and "the ideas of both 
the attributes of God and particular things" have, as 
their efficient cause, God himself, "insofar as he is a 
thinking thing." 3' Perhaps an example will help to 
clarify this applicability. 
Consider the activity of building a house. Spinoza 
states that a cause referred to as final is "nothing 
else but human desire . . . ." For instance, "when we 
say that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or 
that house, we mean nothing more than that'a man . . . 
had a desire to build a house. 1 , 2 7 The specific desire, 
that of "the being inhabited", is really the efficient 
cause." 2' An amplification of the term "desire" will 
illumine how efficient causality relates to the mental 
mode. 
An appetite is an endeavor "when referred to mind 
and body in conjunction." 1' Desire is defined as 
"appetite with consciousness thereof." 2' Desire, then, 
is an efficient cause and is an appetite with consious-
ness appended. Consciousness clearly concerns the men-
tal mode of experience; thus efficient causality ap-
plies to the mental mode of experience. Spinoza's ex-
ample, the activity of building a house, illustrates 
that efficient causality pertains to both the physical 
and mental aspects of experience. 
Man's Conatus 
Spinoza states that "everything insofar as it is in 
itself, endeavors to persist in its own being." 2 1 
Conatus, then, is the self-preserving effort of partic-
ular things. In this endeavor, a thing resists that 
which "could take away its existence." 1 2 In short, 
conatus is "the actual essence of the thing in 
question. 1 , 1 1 The tendency toward self-preservation is 
present in and comprises the very definition of partic-
ular things, for Spinoza. 
Generally speaking, conatus is also a theory that 
concerns the interaction of things. Mote that a par-
ticular thing is, for Spinoza, that which has a condi-
tioned, finite existence. Under this endeavor, "each 
particular thing within the universe, by the eternal 
necessity of the nature of the universe as a whole of 
what it is a part, strives to maintain its 
existence." 1* Nature, then, is comprised of individual 
modes that constantly endeavor to maintain themselves 
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and, in so doing, interact with different particular 
modes that affect them. 
Conatus applies to the attributes of both extension 
and thought. An obvious parallel can here be observed: 
continuance or resistance in movement is the expression 
of the body's conatus. Continuance in thought repre-
sents the mind's conatus. Finally, the mind strives to 
affirm the existence of the body, since any idea negat-
ing the body's existence "cannot be postualted in our 
mind, but is contrary thereto."" 
When conatus refers to the mind alone, the endeavor 
is called "will.'"* "When referred to the mind and 
body in conjunction, it [conatus) is called appe-
tite. W 1 7 Spinoza's point is that desire and appetite 
are equivalent terms. A subtle difference remains, 
though. When we are cognizant of our appetites, desire 
prevails. "Man, however, is aware of his appetites and 
urges (though not of their causes) and so, particularly 
when we have this self-awareness in mind, we may speak 
of desire."" 
Man's Conatus and God 
Man is an individual thing and "individual things 
are nothing but the modifications of attributes of God, 
or modes by which the attributes of God are fixed and 
expressed in a determinate manner."" Spinoza further 
reasons that the essence of both the human body and 
mind "must be conceived through the very essence of 
God."* 8 Inasmuch as individual things depend on and 
participate in Divine substance, they are, in a re-
stricted sense, infinite and eternal. God's causality 
unfolds through eternal infinite modes and its effects 
are likewise eternal and infinite. The idea of " . . . 
every particular thing actually existing, necessarily 
involves the eternal and infinite essence of God."* 1 
Hence a particular being, like man, participates to a 
degree, in eternity: "Now in a sense particular things 
are eternal—i.e., *vi causa cui inhaerent.'"** To the 
extent that individual things participate in the one 
Divine substance, they are eternal.* 1 
Man's conatus has as its source of power, the power 
of God. God is the cause of the being of things or of 
"their continuing in existence."** Thus, "the force by 
which each particular thing persevers in existing fol-
lows from the eternal necessity of God's nature."*' In 
conclusion, then, each individual's endeavor toward 
self-preservation or conatus originates from the neces-
sity and eternity of God's nature. 
Interrelation of Cause and Conatus; 
Assertion of Human Freedom 
Spinoza's typology of cause includes those that are 
"inadequate" and "adequate." Conatus should be placed 
382 
within the context of this distinction. Once this ob-
jective has been accomplished, an affirmation of human 
freedom can be explained. 
An "inadequate 1 1 or partial cause is a "cause 
through which, by itself, its effect cannot be under-
stood."*' Men are "passive" when "something takes 
place within us, or follows from our nature externally, 
we being only the partial cause."* 7 
An "adequate cause" is "a cause through which its 
effect can clearly and distinctly be conceived."** It 
exists "when through our nature something takes place 
within us or externally to us, which can through our 
nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood."*' 
Men can be said to act or be active "when anything 
takes place . . . whereof we are the adequate cause."" 
Each individual thing strives to maintain itself 
and this follows from the nature of God, according to 
Spinoza: "(T]he force by which each particular thing 
perseveres in existing follows from the necessity of 
God's nature."' 1 Clearly the force of conatus is ne-
cessary by virtue of the essence of God; conatus is not 
externally constrained or caused. This fact is basic 
to our understanding Spinoza's conception of human 
freedom. 
Man in Bondage or Constraint 
That which follows from external causes, where man 
is passive, is constrained rather than free. Spinoza 
states that constraint occurs when something "is deter-
mined by something external to itself to a fixed and 
definite method of existence or action."* 1 One can be 
bound, then, when constrained by the action of another 
individual. Man is but a partial cause, concerning 
that which follows from his nature externally. Hence 
bondage is, for Spinoza, equivalent to inadequate 
causality and represents the absence of freedom. 
Man as Active and Free 
Those acts which follow from adequate causes are 
neither compelled nor constrained from without. When 
man is the adequate causal agent of his actions, then 
he is free. Individuals are "active" according to 
Spinoza, when they are the authors (causes) of their 
own actions. To the extent that an individual is 
active—the adequate cause of his own actions—that in-
dividual is free. Here we see that freedom, activity, 
and causal agency are compatible terms. 
How can we free ourselves from the constraint of 
passion and bondage? The determination that charac-
terizes reason or adequate knowledge can release us 
from the yoke of passion. More narrowly, we can modify 
and transform confused ideas and passions (like a par-
ticular emotion) through self-conscious reflection. 
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Spinoza states that "an emotion, which is a passion, 
ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and 
distinct idea thereof."*' Now any emotion that Spinoza 
calls a passion is also a confused idea. When "we form 
a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion . . . the 
emotion will cease [in effect] to be a passion." 1 4 
Accordingly, we attain freedom by forming clear and 
distinct ideas (adequate knowledge) about passions. 
Note that these clear and distinct ideas are causes— 
instances of cognitive or mental determination. Gener-
ally, then, we "determine solely by the knowledge of 
the mind, the remedies against" confused ideas or emo-
tions.** 
Man's Conatus, God and Freedom 
We recall that, for Spinoza, God alone is the sole 
free cause. Moreover, man's conatus derives from the 
"eternal necessity of God's nature"; in short, roan's 
conatus is really God's conatus. Any human act that 
follows from conatus is not constrained or compelled 
from without. Rather, it is the product of adequate 
causality. To the degree that man's acts derive from 
conatus, he can be said to be "free." 
Exposition of Freedom 
Man's freedom, in marked contrast to God's, is not 
perfect (complete). Man's freedom is limited. Man is 
free when he is seen in his proper relation to God. 
Human freedom cannot exist when man is conceived as 
separate from God and the infinity of the whole modal 
system. Human freedom is an extension—a manifesta-
tion—of the power of God. In this context, man's 
freedom is neither absolute nor constant. Rather, an 
individual's being active or free varies in degree. 
Striving to maintain one's self (conatus) can be hin-
dered or limited by opposing the conatus of other 
individuals. In other words, individual things in-
teract and each thing's conatus resists that of another 
in the process of interaction. However, the opposing 
conatus of each particular thing does not constitute 
external constraint per se, as seen in proper relation 
to God. 
The Compatibility of Freedom and Determinism 
In what sense does Spinoza employ the term "free"? 
Clearly Spinoza rejects an idea of "free" as meaning 
uncaused or indeterminate. The matter of a "free" act, 
whether caused or uncaused, is irrelevant. "Freedom" 
is consistently employed by him within the context of a 
thorough-going determinism. But determinism must be 
contrasted with compulsion or constraint; these terms, 
in Spinoza, are not synonymous. 
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Freedom and determinism are comparable terms, but 
freedom contrasts with bondage. The free agent acts in 
a determinate manner, but without being constrained or 
compelled. All acts, both those which are free and 
those which are bound, are caused, determined. But the 
crucial difference lies in the type of determination 
proper to each. Free actions represent adequate types 
of determination; bound acts represent passive in-
stances of determination. 
If freedom is seen as a determined act that is 
devoid of compulsion or external constraint, then 
freedom and determinism are indeed compatible terms. 
Acts can thus be free, yet determined. But freedom as 
Spinoza intended the term, is not compatible with bon-
dage, passivity, or compulsion. 
Critique 
What type of determinism characterizes Spinoza's 
use of freedom? A free person is self-determining in 
that he actively causes his behavior by forming ade-
quate knowledge of passions. Adequate knowledge— 
having clear and distinct ideas--represents self-
directing, rational determination that frees one from 
bondage or servitude. In his view of freedom, Spinoza 
also denies that an individual could have chosen to act 
in any way other than he did." This denial creates 
some difficulties for Spinoza's moral theory. 
Spinoza's unrelenting determinism obviates a norma-
tive ethic. A person's behavior derives from two types 
of determination: either behavior is self-caused 
through adequate knowledge or behavior is externally 
caused (constrained) by passion. As William Frankena 
points out, a central goal of normative ethics "is to 
guide us in our capacity as agents trying to decide 
what we should do in this case and in that."* 7 
Spinoza's metaphysical determinism, however, eliminates 
the prescribing of moral "shoulds" or "oughts," since, 
whether behavior is self-caused or externally caused, 
the person could not have acted other than he did. 
Self-causation and external causation are not determi-
nants of choice. 
The matter does not end here though. What type of 
moral theory are we left with, if a moral agent can 
perform only that action that he ipso facto performed? 
A prescriptive ethic, wherein moral agents are exhorted 
to realize ethical ideals, seems irreconciliable with 
Spinoza'8 determinism. At best, then, Spinoza is left 
with a descriptive ethic, wherein we observe, analyze, 
and describe the moral conduct of agents. Hence 
Spinoza's determinism truncates a traditionally impor-
tant objective of moral theory. In a letter to Spinoza 
(Epistle LXXVII) Oldenburg warns Spinoza about this 
very implication of "universal necessity": (God's) in-
flexible fate, and . . . irresistible power compel us 
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to act in a given manner, nor can we possibly act 
otherwise."*' 
Consider another problem that emerges from 
Spinoza's determinism. The idea of moral responsibil-
ity becomes rather untenable, if antecendnt causes 
necessarily determine subsequent events. Again, 
Oldenburg brought this problem to Spinoza's attention: 
the doctrine of fatalistic necessity renders "[moral] 
rewards and punishments . . . ineffectual . . . . For 
if we men are, in all of actions, moral as well as nat-
ural, under the power of God, like clay in the hands of 
the potter, with what face can any of us be accused of 
doing this or that, seeing that it was impossible 
[emphasis added] to do otherwise."** Oldenburg con-
cludes his argument by saying that "Everyone may plead, 
'Thy power cannot be escaped from, 0 God; therefore, 
since I could not act otherwise, I may justly be 
excused.'"' 0 Spinozistic determinism precludes moral 
blame and praise. 
Finally, Spinoza's problem intensifies when he 
speaks of ideals that moral agents ought to seek: 
. . . [EJvery man should (emphasis added) love 
himself, should see that which is useful to him 
. . . and should, each for himself, endeavor as 
far as he can to preserve his own being.' 1 
Spinoza's advocacy of metaphysical determinism con-
flicts with his prescribing morals shoulds; consider 
the problematic alternatives this poses: 
I. 1. Spinoza cannot both advocate metaphysical 
determinism and prescribe moral shoulds. 
2. Spinoza advocates metaphysical determin-
ism. 
3. Thus Spinoza cannot prescribe moral 
shoulds. 
II. 1. Spinoza cannot both advocate metaphysical 
determinism and prescribe moral shoulds. 
2. Spinoza prescribes moral shoulds. 
3. Thus Spinoza cannot advocate metaphysical 
determinism. 
Spinoza cannot have it both ways. But he does advocate 
metaphysical determinism, and he prescribes moral 
shoulds. Accordingly, Spinoza's denying that an indi-
vidual could have chosen to act other than he in fact 
acted, renders his moral theory problematic. 
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